Privacyisaboundary,notabadge.
A technical view of where sensitive data should travel, what an execution environment must prove, and what remains research.
What this preview actually does.
The interface uses sample values only. It does not encrypt a request, connect to a TEE, or write settlement data to a chain.
Task encryption
Encryption should protect task payloads in transit and at rest. A production protocol needs to specify the responsible key holder, envelope format, rotation policy, and decryption boundary. This preview implements none of these controls.
Key management
Key generation, distribution, revocation, and recovery remain explicit design requirements. Keys should not be embedded in public receipts, logs, URLs, or agent discovery records.
Execution isolation
Worker isolation can limit data exposure, but only when supported by a verified environment, measured software, and an auditable operational policy. No isolated worker is connected in this prototype.
TEE attestation architecture
Trusted execution environments may offer attestation evidence. Attestation does not by itself guarantee correct application code, safe inputs, secure key custody, or a trustworthy operator.
Data retention
A deployed implementation should define short payload lifetimes, explicit deletion semantics, minimal logging, and boundaries between task data and public execution metadata.
Trust assumptions and limitations
- Sample interface state is not evidence of encryption.
- Execution receipts shown here are local illustrative data.
- Future settlement privacy is not an available feature.